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SHAM LITIGATION AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
THOMAS A. BALMER*
Litigation costs money. This is an obvious, widely discussed,
and usually deplored fact.1 More important than the expense itself,
however, is the consequence that lawsuits can be used offensively
by corporations to harm competitors and to protect monopoly
power.2 By filing suits or intervening in actions before courts and
administrative agencies, large companies and trade associations
can tie up smaller businesses in uncertain and expensive proceed-
ings, thereby increasing the cost of doing business and preventing
or delaying new entries into a particular market. When such law-
suits are brought by agreement between several companies or by a
firm with monopoly power in a given market, antitrust questions
frequently arise.3 Even though legitimate actions brought to pro-
tect patents or trade secrets or to enforce valid noncompetition
agreements may have anticompetitive consequences, such actions
* A.B. 1974, Oberlin College; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. Member, Massachusetts
Bar. The author is an associate with Wald, Harkrader & Ross, Washington, D.C.
1. With apologies to D. BALmER, STATR ELECTION SERVICES IN OREGON 1 (Citizen's Re-
search Foundation Stud. No. 21, 1972).
2. See generally R. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADox: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
347-64 (1978). One of the virtues of Bork's analysis is that he treats sham litigation as an
independent variety of antitrust violation, rather than merely as an exception to the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine. See also Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Gov-
ernment Action: The Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. Cm. L.
REv. 80, 104-10 (1977).
3. The Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy" in restraint of trade and all attempts and conspiracies to monopo-
lize. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). This article deals primarily with cases in which "baseless" or
"sham" litigation is used to restrain trade or to monopolize. Proof of a sham suit is not
sufficient to make out an antitrust violation, of course. The antitrust plaintiff must also
prove the other elements of an antitrust violation, including an agreement to litigate which
unreasonably restrained trade or the existence of monopoly power which the litigation was
intended to preserve. However, if these other elements of a Sherman Act violation are not
present, the victim of the baseless suit may still have a cause of action for a competitive
tort. See Boone, Single Corporation Competitive Torts and the Sherman Act: A Projection
Based Upon a Review of The Albert Pick, Atlantic Heel, and Perryton Cases, 2 GA. L. REv.
372 (1968); Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 HARv. L. REv. 1289 (1940); cf. Note, The Pick-
Barth Doctrine: Should Unfair Competition Belong Under the Sherman Act? 31 BAYLOR L.
REV. 253 (1979).
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are protected by the first amendment right to petition the govern-
ment.4 This immunity from antitrust liability is generally referred
to as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, after the two leading cases 5
that established the right to use governmental processes despite
the prohibitions of the Sherman Act.
With the growth of government and the dramatic increase in
the areas of life subject to legislative, judicial, or agency regulation,
there is greater opportunity for one firm to sue a competitor or
oppose in an administrative proceeding some license or approval
sought by a competitor. And just as the legitimate use of such liti-
gation has increased, so too has the practice of bringing "sham"
suits designed solely to harm or eliminate a competitor rather than
to enforce a legitimate right. Unlike the legitimate activities pro-
tected from antitrust liability by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,
sham litigation is unprotected and may constitute a violation of
the Sherman Act. This article will first examine the sham excep-
tion to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, with particular emphasis
on the application of the Sherman Act to baseless suits brought for
the sole purpose of eliminating actual or potential competitors. It
will then consider two related and unresolved questions regarding
sham litigation: first, whether baseless litigation itself can lead to
antitrust liability or whether the wrongful conduct must be so per-
vasive as to bar the antitrust plaintiff from meaningful access to
the courts; and second, whether a single sham suit can constitute
an antitrust violation.7 Finally, the first amendment and antitrust
4. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law.., abridging...
the right of the people ... to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. L See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
510 (1972)("The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of peti-
tion."). On California Motor Transp., see Oppenheim, Antitrust Immunity for Joint Efforts
to Influence Adjudication Before Administrative Agencies and Courts-from Noerr-Pen-
nington to Trucking Unlimited, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 209 (1972). While litigation to
enforce a valid non-competition agreement is protected, a suit brought to enforce an overly
broad and anticompetitive agreement may be an antitrust violation, as may the agreement
itself. This article is concerned with the litigation, not with the antitrust status of the un-
derlying agreement.
5. United Mineworkers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See Fischel, supra note 2, for
a general discussion of the doctrine.
6. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); California Motor Transp.
Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
7. This question was touched upon but not decided in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.,
433 U.S. 623 (1977). See Note, 1977 Wis. L. Rav. 1208.
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policy issues involved in Noerr-Pennington cases will be analyzed,
with a view toward making some useful generalizations about sham
litigation as an antitrust violation.
I. THE NOERR-PENNINGTON DOCTRINE AND THE SHAM EXCEPTION
A. Development of the Doctrine
Unlike many "exceptions" to judicially announced rules, the
sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity was not a post-hoc
creation; in fact, the exception was suggested in Eastern Railroad
Presidents Conference v. Noerr,8 the opinion that first established
the immunity. In Noerr, forty-one truck operators and their trade
association sued a group of railroads, a public relations firm re-
tained by the railroads, and an association of the railroads' presi-
dents, claiming that the defendants had con'ducted a publicity
campaign aimed at the passage of legislation which would benefit
the railroads and harm the truckers. These joint activities, the
truckers claimed, were part of a conspiracy to restrain trade and
monopolize the long distance freight business by eliminating the
truckers as competitors. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously
that such joint attempts to influence the legislative process were
immune from antitrust liability, noting that for a representative
democracy to be effective, the people must be able to engage in
political activity and inform the government of their wishes.9 Fur-
thermore, the Court recognized that to construe the Sherman Act
to impair the first amendment right to petition the government
would raise serious constitutional questions. 10 The Court ruled that
immunity was to be granted for such collective activities even
though their sole purpose was to eliminate competition and even
though the tactics used could be termed "unethical."" However,
the Court cautioned that not all attempts to influence the govern-
ment are immune from antitrust liability: "[T]here may be situa-
tions in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward in-
fluencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor and the application of
8. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
9. Id. at 137.
10. Id. at 137-38.
11. Id. at 140-42.
1980]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
the Sherman Act would be justified. '12
In 1972, the "sham exception" dictum of Noerr became the
holding in California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited.13 In
this leading case, the Supreme Court upheld a complaint alleging
that defendants (nineteen large California trucking firms) insti-
tuted groundless proceedings before state agencies and courts to
prevent plaintiffs (fifteen other trucking firms) from obtaining nec-
essary administrative approvals. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants
"instituted the proceedings and actions... with or without proba-
ble cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases. '14 The Court
held that such activities on the part of competitors could be anti-
trust violations if they involved "abuse" of administrative and ju-
dicial processes; 5 such "abuse" might be found if the defendants
by their actions effectively, closed "the machinery of the agencies
and the courts" to their competitors or if there was a "pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims" involved.16 The very fact such suits
were baseless would be evidence that they were instituted in order
to drive a competitor out of business rather than to assert a legiti-
mate legal right.17
California Motor Transport extended Noerr-Pennington im-
munity to legitimate judicial proceedings-prior cases had pro-
vided immunity only for attempts to influence legislative and exec-
utive action-and attempted to clarify the sham exception to that
immunity. The decision does not, however, provide a clear indica-
tion of what litigation is protected and what is not. While the
Court noted that the questioned proceedings were instituted with-
out regard to whether probable cause existed, 8 that fact appeared
to be relevant primarily because it indicated an attempt to deprive
competitors of meaningful access to the agencies and the courts.19
California Motor Transport thus left unsettled the question of
whether the expense and harassment caused by baseless litigation
could constitute an antitrust violation, even if "access to the agen-
cies and courts" was not actually restricted. The issue received fur-
12. Id. at 144.
13. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
14. Id. at 512.
15. Id. at 513.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 512. See also id. at 516, 518 (Stewart, J., concurrfng).
19. Id.
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ther attention, although not final resolution, in Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States.2 0 The district court decision in Otter Tail
Power, handed down prior to California Motor Transport, had
concluded that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine applied only to at-
tempts to influence legislative and executive activities and not to
litigation.21 In remanding for reconsideration in light of California
Motor Transport, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to add
an important gloss to its prior decision. California Motor Trans-
port, it said, "held that the principle of Noerr may also apply to
the use of administrative or judicial processes where the purpose to
suppress competition is evidenced by repetitive lawsuits carrying
the hallmark of insubstantial claims and thus is within the mere
sham exception announced in Noerr.' ' 22 This interpretation sug-
gests that antitrust plaintiffs need not prove that they have some-
how been denied access to courts or agencies: apparently, it is suffi-
cient to show that the defendants have tried to suppress
competition through the instrumentality of the courts by filing
baseless lawsuits. With Otter Tail Power, the Court seems to have
established a clear exception to Noerr-Pennington when sham liti-
gation is brought for the sole purpose of restraining competition.2
20. 410 U.S. 366 (1973):
21. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971).
22. 410 U.S. at 380.
23. Otter Tail Power was in fact a paradigm case for such a ruling, as it shows a signifi-
cant way in which a monopolist can prevent or delay new entrants into a market by means
of litigation. Otter Tail was an electric power company serving Minnesota and North and
South Dakota. When its franchises in several towns expired, the towns decided to establish
municipal electricity distribution systems. To finance these systems, the towns planned to
sell electric revenue bonds, and one condition of sale was a legal opinion to the effect that
there was no pending litigation which might impair the value or legality of the bonds. By
instituting suits challenging the bonds, Otter Tail was able to prevent the municipalities
from establishing their own distribution systems. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366, 368-72 (1973). As the district court found:
Most of the litigation sponsored by [Otter Tail) was carried to the highest avail-
able appellate court and although all of it was unsuccessful on the merits, the
institution and maintenance of it had the effect of halting, or appreciably slow-
ing, efforts for municipal ownership. The delay thus occasioned and the large
financial burden imposed on the towns' limited treasury dampened local enthu-
siasm for public ownership.
United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Minn. 1973). See also Ernest
W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 615 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1980).
1980]
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B. The Current Status of Sham Litigation
Beginning with Noerr, the Supreme Court has upheld the
right of businesses to seek to influence governmental decisions,
even when that effort is the product of an anticompetitive intent.
However, if the only goal of petitioning is to interfere directly with
a competitor's business relationships, and there is no genuine ef-
fort to influence governmental action, antitrust liability will result.
The extension of Noerr to executive branch decisions in Pen-
nington and to administrative and judicial proceedings in Califor-
nia Motor Transport and Otter Tail Power created some confu-
sion. One problem arose from the point made so strongly in
Pennington that "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted
effort to influence public officials regardless of intent or pur-
pose. '"24 If the anticompetitive actions themselves are protected,
then the existence of anticompetitive intent is not enough to estab-
lish an antitrust violation.2 5 Since, in the litigation context, even
the most evil motive does not prove that a lawsuit is a sham, courts
tend to focus on conduct and whether suits are based on probable
cause.26 This does not mean that intent is irrelevant; as Robert
Bork puts it, "it is difficult to imagine a situation in which a spe-
cific intent to monopolize or restrain trade would not be an essen-
tial element of the case. ' 7 It does mean, however, that courts will
be leery about inferring that litigation is baseless simply because
the plaintiff has an anticompetitive intent,28 and that they will pay
greater attention to the allegedly frivolous nature of the litigation.
24. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 670 (1965)(emphasis added).
25. Id. at 669-70.
26. See, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 1320,
1346 (N.D. Ind. 1979), afld in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.
1980); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Ill.
1978). If the antitrust plaintiff fails to allege in some detail the defendant's sham conduct,
and merely makes conclusory assertions of anticompetitive intent, the complaint will often
be dismissed.
27. R. Bork, supra note 2, at 357. See also Blair Foods, Inc. v. Ranchers Cotton Oil, 610
F.2d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1980)(plaintiff alleging sham litigation antitrust violation must show
specific intent to monopolize).
28. See Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301 (E.D. Mich.
1979); Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd,
578 F.2d 1372 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 983 (1978). However, some courts have
apparently drawn such an inference. See, e.g., Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Hawaii 1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 913
(1974).
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While the first amendment limitations on the inferences that may
be drawn from anticompetitive intent make it more difficult to
prove that litigation is a "sham," the guidelines set by the Su-
preme Court in this area are fairly clear.2 9
Another difference between the application of Noerr-Pen-
nington to legislative and executive petitioning and to judicial pro-
ceedings is the range of conduct that is protected. In this area too,
Supreme Court guidance has been relatively straightforward. It is
well established that possibly "unethical" conduct, including mis-
representations about oneself or others, may be protected by Noerr
if it is part of the political process or an attempt to influence legis-
lation, while the same conduct in a judicial proceeding would be
considered a sham and an unprotected abuse of the judicial
process.30
Two other aspects of the sham litigation antitrust violation are
not as well-defined, however. First, as earlier discussed, the Court
in California Motor Transport stated that antitrust liability would
be found if a group of companies acted in concert to deny a com-
petitor "free and meaningful access to the agencies and courts."3 1
Despite the attempt to explain this language in Otter Tail Power,
lower courts continue to differ over whether the mere initiation of
baseless litigation is sufficient to invoke liability, or whether the
plaintiff's abuse must be so flagrant and constant that the defen-
dant is effectively denied access to the courts.2 Second, there has
been some confusion over whether the antitrust plaintiff must
show that numerous baseless suits have been filed or whether a
29. The opinions in California Motor Transp., while not models of clarity, do show that
a litigant's anticompetitive intent does not by itself establish that his suit is a sham. Califor-
nia Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-13 (1972); id. at 517-18
(Stewart, J., concurring). Only when that intent is accompanied by conduct which seeks "to
discourage and ultimately to prevent [the other party] from invoking [the governmental]
process," id. at 518, or by suits "carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims," will an anti-
trust violation be found. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973).
30. R. Bork, supra note 2, at 359-64; Holzer, An Analysis for Reconciling the Antitrust
Laws with the Right to Petition: Noerr-Pennington in Light of Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27
EMORY L. Rsv. 673, 691-93 (1978).
31. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972).
32. Compare Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real Estate, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1134
(N.D.N.Y. 1977)("The gist of Trucking Unlimited is access-barring.") with Pennwalt Corp.
v. Zenith Laboratories, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 413, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1979)("The sham exception
exists to prevent the filing of groundless lawsuits which are begun only to harass and injure
the defendants."). See also Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476 F.
Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979).
1980]
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single sham suit is enough.33 Because these two related issues have
divided the courts and because they shed light on the general sham
litigation issues, they deserve more extended discussion.
II. THE SHAM SUIT STANDARD: "ACCESS-BARRING" OR
ABUSE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS?
The confusion surrounding the sham suit standard can be
traced to California Motor Transport, where the Court spoke sev-
eral times of "a purpose to deprive the competitors of meaningful
access to the agencies and the courts," but also based its decision
on the fact judicial processes had been abused. 4 The difficulties in
articulating the appropriate standard result from the juxtaposition
of these two concepts with no explanation of their relationship.
Specifically, the Court stated:
[A] pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the
factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have
been abused. That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is
drawn, the case is established that abuse of processes produced an illegal re-
sult, viz., effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies and
courts."5
Although the implication that any abuse of the judicial process is
tantamount to barring effective access to the courts appears to be
33. Compare Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1978); First Nat'l Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Nat'l Bank, [1980] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH)
Trade Cas. 63,170 (D. Minn. 1979); Technicon Medical Information Systems Corp. v.
Green Bay Packaging, [1980] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 63,025 (E.D. Wis. 1979);
Colorado Petroleum Marketers Ass'n v. Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373 (D. Colo. 1979);
Cyborg Systems, Inc. v. Management Science America, Inc., [1978] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH)
Trade Cas. 1 61,927 (N.D. IIl. 1978); and Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.,
414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976)(all holding that a single sham petition may constitute
antitrust violation) with Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Miracle Mile Assoc., Inc. v. City of Rochester, [1979] TRADE REG.
REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 62,735 (W.D.N.Y. 1979); MCI Communications Corp. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1978); and Mountain Grove Cemetery
Ass'n v. Norwalk Vault Co., [1977] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 61,709 (D. Conn.
1977)(stating that repetitive sham petitions must be shown). See also the cases cited in
Fischel, supra note 2, at 108, n.151.
34. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972)("right of access to the courts"); id. at 511 ("free and unlimited access"; "machinery
of the agencies and the courts was effectively closed"); id. at 512 ("instituted the proceed-
ings with or without probable cause"); id. at 513 ("administrative and judicial processes
have been abused.").
35. Id. at 513.
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an important statement on the meaning of "effective access," in
common parlance barring "access to the courts" indicates a far
more serious and comprehensive pattern of acts. In California Mo-
tor Transport the two concepts could be treated as identical, be-
cause by intervening in every administrative proceeding, with or
without probable cause, the antitrust defendants both abused
agency processes and effectively closed the machinery of the
agency to the antitrust plaintiffs. In the more typical sham suit
case, however, the antitrust plaintiff is denied "access to the
courts" only in a very strained meaning of that phrase.
Perhaps the perplexity of California Motor Transport lies in
the Court's use of the phrase "free access" to describe the rights of
both the antitrust plaintifs and the antitrust defendants. Al-
though "access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right
of petition," 87 and is certainly a right that should be enjoyed by all,
the filing of baseless suits is not a part of the "free access" enjoyed
by antitrust defendants. And anticompetitive, sham litigation may
be undeserving of first amendment protection and thus constitute
an antitrust violation even when it falls short of actually depriving
antitrust plaintiffs of "free access."38 In short, the "free access"
language may be useful in recalling the importance of the right to
petition protected by Noerr-Pennington, but it does not identify in
a useful way the activities of the antitrust defendant which come
within the sham exception or the type of deprivation an antitrust
plaintiff must suffer to make out a violation. Indeed, in this con-
text "free access" is simply a red herring. Otter Tail Power's elabo-
ration of California Motor Transport would seem to settle the
question, as the Court there interpreted the earlier case as holding
that the sham exception applied to the use of judicial or adminis-
trative processes where "insubstantial" claims were put forward
with the purpose of suppressing competition. Otter Tail thus indi-
cated that the "access-barring" language in California Motor
Transport was intended to be synonomous with abuse of the judi-
cial process in the general sense, and not limited to cases where
36. Id.
37. Id. at 510.
38. Baseless litigation or suits involving abuse of process may drive a competitor out of
business or prevent him from expanding even if the litigation does not literally bar the
competitor from access to the courts. Such actions may thus constitute antitrust violations
despite the fact that the competitor's first amendment rights were not impaired.
19801
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access was literally barred. This interpretation was followed in
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., where all three opinions assumed
that the filing of baseless lawsuits with the purpose of eliminating
a competitor could constitute an antitrust violation, even if the
sham litigation was not so pervasive as to deny effective access to
the courts."9
Despite Otter Tail and Lektro-Vend, the "free access" lan-
guage of California Motor Transport has continued to find its way
into some lower court opinions.40 In Wilmorite, Inc. v. Eagan Real
Estate, Inc.,4 1 a district court held that repetitive and allegedly
baseless suits filed by competitors did not constitute an antitrust
violation. While the decision seems correct on its facts,42 the
court's adoption of the "access-barring" standard demonstrates the
flaws in that standard. The court at first seemed to equate abuse of
the judicial process with "access-barring," as the majority opinion
did in California Motor Transport.4 3 However, it went on to inter-
pret the holding in that case as "based on the notion that the de-
fendants could so abuse the adjudicatory process as to deny plain-
tiffs meaningful access to that forum,"'44 implying that particularly
flagrant abuse is required. The court concluded that the "gist" of
California Motor Transport is that actual access-barring is re-
39. See 433 U.S. 623, 635 n.6 (1977)(plurality opinion)("sham litigation in state courts
may constitute an antitrust violation"); id. at 643 (concurring opinion)(pattern of baseless
repetitive claims may constitute antitrust violation); id. at 653 (dissenting opinion)("illegal
use of state court litigation as a method of monopolizing or restraining trade is ... a viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.").
40. See Miracle Mile Assoc., Inc. v. City of Rochester, [1980] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH)
Trade Cas. 63,207, at 77,927 (2d Cir. 1980); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986,
998 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 688 (1980)(concurring opinion); Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 176-78 (D. Del. 1979).
41. 454 F. Supp. 1124 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1372 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 983 (1978).
42. For example, the antitrust defendants were at least partially successful in the state
court suits they filed. 454 F. Supp. at 1135. Indeed, it was the antitrust plaintiffs who ap-
peared to be bringing repetitive baseless suits. The extensive litigation is described in
Wilmorite and in Miracle Mile Assoc., Inc. v. City of Rochester, [1979] TRADE REo.
REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 62,735 (W.D.N.Y. 1979).43. See 454 F. Supp. 1124, 1127, 1130 (N.D.N.Y. 1977), where the court stated, "Per-
jury, bribery and misrepresentations in the adjudicating process corrupt it and effectively
bar access to agency actions or the courts." In California Motor Transp. the Supreme Court
said that a conclusion by the fact finder that "the administrative and judicial processes have
been abused" establishes that one party has "effectively barr[ed the other] from access to
the agencies and courts." 404 U.S. 508, 513.
44. Id. at 1131 (emphasis added).
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quired,' '45 and therefore rejected plaintiffs' contention that "the
mere filing of lawsuits constitutes access-barring conduct. '46 The
opinion seems to imply that the same result would be reached even
if the suits were utterly frivolous,47 thus illustrating the unneces-
sary confusion caused by California Motor Transport and the fail-
ure of later opinions to resolve the problem.
The use of the "access-barring" standard by some courts is not
surprising, given the importance of the right of "free and meaning-
ful access" and other first amendment rights that received such
prominent discussion in California Motor Transport. Deprivation
of "free access" suggests a higher requirement for antitrust liability
than simple abuse of the judicial process, and thus provides a
means of giving special protection to first amendment values. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has not required a showing of deprivation
of free access before antitrust liability can result.48 More impor-
tantly, as discussed below, first amendment rights of antitrust de-
fendants can be adequately protected without imposing such a
standard.
HI. THE SINGLE SHAM SUIT
The major cases dealing with the sham exception to Noerr-
Pennington immunity speak of antitrust liability for a "pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims." 49 Their reasoning, however, does not
make multiple baseless suits a prerequisite to liability: a monopo-
list or a combination of persons who brings a single suit it knows
has no legal foundation in order to restrain competition has vio-
lated the antitrust laws. A single, well-timed, and carefully pleaded
suit, with appeals, can cost a potential competitor large amounts of
money and time, even if the suit is completely frivolous. While
both California Motor Transport and Otter Tail Power involved
numerous baseless suits, and while a plaintiff who has had a frivo-
45. Id. at 1134. The court also stated that "access-barring is the cornerstone to the
sham exception." Id. at 1134-35.
46. Id. at 1135.
47. E.g., id. at 1136, where the court noted that "what plaintiffs overlook in relying on
Otter Tail is that defendant's conduct there was part of a larger unlawful scheme character-
ized by monopolistic practices."
48. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977); Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
49. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973); California Motor
Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
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lous suit thrown out of court once has even less excuse for litigat-
ing a similar claim again, there is no convincing conceptual reason
for distinguishing a single sham suit from a pattern of such suits.
Predicating an antitrust violation solely on a single sham suit
is rare, probably because the antitrust defendant who brought the
baseless suit is unlikely to have refrained from other overt acts in
restraint of trade or from initiating other baseless legal proceed-
ings. The single sham suit issue does arise, however, and was re-
cently considered by the Supreme Court in Vendo Co. v. Lektro-
Vend Corp.50 In Lektro-Vend the antitrust plaintiffs, in response
to a state court suit against them for breach of non-competition
agreements, brought suit in federal court claiming that the agree-
ments violated the antitrust laws and "that the purpose of [the
antitrust defendant's] state-court lawsuit was to 'unlawfully har-
ass' respondents and to 'eliminate the competition' of respon-
dents." 51 The federal suit lay dormant while the state litigation
proceeded, and only after a state judgment for $7 million was
awarded did the antitrust plaintiffs seek a federal injunction
against collection. An Illinois district court granted a preliminary
injunction, finding both that the non-competition agreements
might be overly broad and anticompetitive and that collection of
the state court judgment might reduce competition.2 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed, 53 but a divided Supreme Court reversed the lower
court decision." Justice Rehnquist's opinion for a three judge plu-
rality concentrated on the anti-injunction statute,55 and held that
the federal district court should not have intervened in the state
court proceeding by enjoining enforcement of the judgment.5 Jus-
tice Rehnquist stressed, however, that the opinion was not in-
tended to impair California Motor Transport's holding "that
50. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
51. Id. at 627.
52. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. IM. 1975).
53. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1976).
54. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976). The anti-injunction statute generally prohibits federal
courts from enjoining state court proceedings unless an injunction is "expressly authorized"
by federal statute, is "necessary in aid" of a federal court's jurisdiction, or is necessary to
"protect or effectuate" a federal judgment. Id.
56. The issue was whether Section 16 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976), which
authorizes injunctions as remedies in antitrust cases, was an "express authorization" by
Congress such that it could be the basis for an injunction against state court litigation. See
Redish, The Anti-injunction Statute Reconsidered, 44 U. CI. L. REv. 717 (1977).
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harassing and sham state-court proceedings of a repetitive nature
could be part of an anticompetitive scheme or conspiracy. ' '  Thus,
the plurality opinion made it clear that baseless litigation may in-
deed constitute an antitrust violation, but did not decide whether
a single baseless suit might be enough. The plurality referred to
California Motor Transport for the proposition that while one
baseless claim might go unnoticed, "a pattern of baseless, repeti-
tive claims may emerge" which leads to a conclusion that the judi-
cial process has been abused.58 The occasional references in the
plurality opinion to repetitive baseless suits, however, are dicta in-
tended to support the policy of the plurality's interpretation of the
anti-injunction statute, and do not directly confront the single
sham suit question in the antitrust context.59 The result in Lektro-
Vend is thus the narrow holding that a federal court can enjoin the
commencement of additional state court suits-not because two
suits constitute an antitrust violation while one does not, but
rather because the anti-injunction statute only prohibits the en-
joining of existing state suits.60 In dicta that has been relied upon
in several single sham suit decisions since Lektro-Vend, 1 the plu-
rality noted that the refusal to enjoin existing state suits was not
particularly burdensome to defendants in those baseless state
court proceedings. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
57. 433 U.S. at 635 n.6.
58. Id. at 636.
59. The plurality opinion clearly rests on an interpretation of the anti-injunction stat-
ute, noting that "because we agree with petitioner that the District Court's order violated
the Anti-Injunction Act, we reach none of its other contentions." Id. at 629. The plurality
agrees that "judicial decisions have construed the prohibition of the antitrust laws to in-
clude sham and frivolous state-court proceedings," id. at 637 n.8, and holds only that, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, an ongoing state proceeding may not be enjoined by a
federal court. Id. at 630-41. The discussion of repetitive litigation deals only with whether
such litigation can be enjoined, id. at 635 n.6, 639 n.9, and not with the requirements for an
antitrust violation. Indeed, the plurality clearly states:
Here the District Court is entirely free to proceed with the litigation on the
merits of respondents' antitrust claim against petitioner, and to grant damages
and such other relief as may be appropriate if it determines the issues in favor of
respondents. All that we conclude is that it may not include as a part of that
relief an injunction against an already pending state-court proceeding.
Id. at 637 n.8.
60. Id. at 636; see id. at 637 n.8.
61. See, e.g., Colorado Petroleum Marketers Assn v. Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373
(D. Colo. 1979); Cyborg Systems, Inc. v. Management Science America, Inc., [1978] TRa"n
REG. RE'.(CCH) Trade Cas. 1 61,927 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
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Any 'disadvantage' to which the federal plaintiff is put in the initial proceed-
ing [by his inability to enjoin the existing state court suit] is diminished by
his ability to set up the federal antitrust claim as an affirmative defense, re-
viewable by this Court under 28 U.S.C. Section 1257(3), and his ability to sue
for treble damages resulting from the vexatious prosecution of that state-
court litigation.6
2
The plurality opinion thus indicated that a single baseless state
court suit, while not subject to interruption by a federal injunction,
could be the basis for an antitrust claim, either as an affirmative
defense in the state court proceeding or in a separate federal anti-
trust suit.
The two additional justices needed for a majority concurred in
the judgment, but offered a different basis for decision. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Chief Justice Burger, stated that in some cir-
cumstances a federal court in an antitrust case could enjoin ongo-
ing state proceedings.6 3 They agreed, however, that an injunction
should not be issued in Lektro-Vend because only one state court
suit was involved and that was not enough to constitute an anti-
trust violation. They relied on the "pattern of baseless repetitive
claims" language used in prior cases," and did not look beyond
those words to the law and policy on which they were based.65 Jus-
tice Stevens, writing for the four dissenters, reached the common
sense conclusion that under the anti-injunction statute federal
courts cannot enjoin any and all state court proceedings, but they
can enjoin a state court proceeding which is itself an antitrust vio-
lation.66 Justice Stevens reviewed the precedents relied upon in
California Motor Transport-the case where the "pattern of base-
less, repetitive claims" language first appeared-and found that
they all involved "a single use of the adjudicatory process to vio-
62. 433 U.S. at 635 n.6.
63. Id. at 644.
64. Id.; see id. at 645.
65. In a footnote, however, Justice Blackmun seemed to leave open the possibility that
repetitive sham suits need not be shown, stating: "Since I believe that federal courts should
be hesitant indeed to enjoin on-going state court proceedings, I am of the opinion that a
pattern of baseless, repetitive claims pr some equivalent showing of grave abuse must exist
before an injunction would be proper." Id. at 644 (emphasis added). It is not completely
clear, therefore, whether Blackmun's concurring opinion is based on his interpretation of the
antitrust laws or of 28 U.S.C. § 2283. See Redish, supra note 56, at 741-42; Fischel, supra
note 2, at 109-10.
66. 433 U.S. at 654.
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late the antitrust laws." 67 Moreover, the Court's use of that phrase
"as an illustration of an antitrust violation ...did not thereby
circumscribe the category to that one example."6 8 There was sim-
ply no basis for a blanket rule that a single sham suit could not
constitute an antitrust violation.6 9
Despite the attention given to the single sham suit issue in the
concurring and dissenting opinions, both opinions failed to distin-
guish clearly between the Lektro-Vend situation, in which a single
frivolous suit was part of a series of overt anticompetitive acts, and
the more difficult case in which the sole anticompetitive act is the
prosecution of a baseless suit. In Lektro-Vend, the antitrust plain-
tiffs had alleged a number of anticompetitive acts, including the
use of overly-broad noncompetition agreements and an aggressive
acquisition program, in addition to the baseless litigation itself.70
The issue before the district court, then, was not whether a sham
suit could be the sole basis of an antitrust violation, but whether a
single suit could be considered as one of the overt acts. 1 The con-
curring opinion apparently ignored the district court's finding of
several overt anticompetitive acts, and treated the case as involv-
ing only one such act-an allegedly baseless lawsuit. The concur-
rence thus gives undue emphasis to the single suit/multiple suit
dichotomy. The dissenters, while noting that the state court litiga-
tion was only one of several overt acts, made their task more diffi-
cult by relying exclusively on that litigation rather than on the ex-
istence of other anticompetitive conduct by the antitrust
defendants.
Most cases dealing with the single sham suit question have in-
volved a number of alleged anticompetitive acts in addition to liti-
gation, and have focused on whether one suit or a pattern of suits
was necessary.72 Although it seems clear that in cases similar to
67. Id. at 661 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 662.
69. The dissenters' position has been approved by several commentators. See, e.g., 1 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw, 203b n.7 (1978); Fischel, supra note 2, at 109-10.
See also Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity for Concerted Attempts to Influence
Courts and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Pro-
cess, 86 H v. L. REv. 715, 728 (1973).
70. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 626-27 (1977).
71. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. at 534-35; see also Vendo Co. v.
Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. at 646 (dissenting opinion).
72. See, e.g., Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Mo.
1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977). See also note 33 supra and cases cited therein.
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Lektro-Vend-involving a single state suit and an attempt to en-
join ongoing state proceedings-an injunction will usually be de-
nied,7 3 the general single suit issues have not been resolved. Sev-
eral pre-Lektro-Vend cases relied on Otter Tail and California
Motor Transport in suggesting that a pattern of baseless litigation
is necessary to constitute an antitrust violation,7 4 while others indi-
cated that a single suit might be sufficient. 5 For example, in
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,7 ' the Supreme Court held that a single suit for infringement
of a fraudulently procured patent could be a violation of the Sher-
man Act. While the prohibited conduct in Walker Process involved
fraud on the Patent Office in addition to the baseless infringement
suit, its rationale-that frivolous litigation which restrains compe-
tition is an antitrust violation-applies to the single sham suit.77
Another pre-Lektro-Vend case, Associated Radio Service Co. v.
Page Airways, Inc., s indicated that the filing of a single lawsuit is
sufficient. There, the court drew an analogy to the tort of abuse of
process and held that bringing suit "to secure an objective other
than the judgment purportedly sought in that proceeding" could
73. E.g., Robert Heller Assoc. v. Sperry Univac Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 452 F. Supp.
142 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
74. Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1314 (E.D. Mich.
1979); Miracle Mile Assoc., Inc. v. City of Rochester, [1979] TRADE REG. RFP.(CCH) Trade
Cas. 62,735, at 78,151 (W.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
[1980] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 63,207 (2d Cir. 1980); MCI Communications
Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Mountain Grove
Cemetery Assn v. Norwalk Vault Co., [1977] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. % 61,709, at
72,890-91 (D. Conn. 1977); Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167
(E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977).
75. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 546 n.6 (5th Cir.
1978); Colorado Petroleum Marketers Assn v. Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373, 377-78 (D.
Colo. 1979); First Nat'I Bank of Omaha v. Marquette Natl Bank, [1980] TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) Trade Cas. % 63,170, at 77,832-33 (D. Minn. 1979); Technicon Medical Information
Systems Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging, [1980] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 1 63,025
(E.D. Wis. 1979); Cyborg Systems, Inc. v. Management Science America Inc., [1978] TRADE
REG. RF..(CCH) Trade Cas. 61,927 (N.D. IM. 1978); Associated Radio Serv. v. Page Air-
ways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
76. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
77. Walker Process is also a particularly persuasive precedent for the validity of anti-
trust suits based on sham state court litigation which alleges mislise of trade secrets. Trade
secrets may be simply unpatented or unpatentable intellectual property. Baseless suits to
prevent the use of techniques or processes, which are not legitimate trade secrets, should be
treated like suits against the infringement of fraudulently obtained patents. See also Mach-
Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).
78. 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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constitute an antitrust violation. While the court was willing to
accept a single baseless suit rather than require a pattern of sham
litigation, it still made antitrust liability contingent upon addi-
tional specific acts in furtherance of anticompetitive ends, "other
than those acts incidental to the normal use of the Courts."8
The decisions after Lektro-Vend disagree on the single sham
suit issue. One line of precedent, referring to the dictum in the
plurality opinion and the clear statement in the dissent regarding
single suits, concludes that seven members of the Supreme Court
would find that a single sham suit is sufficient. 1 This appears to be
a sound conclusion. One recent case did not rely on Lektro-Vend,
but instead looked to the earlier Otter Tail anid California Motor
Transport cases and concluded that while "a pattern of repetitive,
baseless claims is strong evidence of sham petitioning, ' 82 proof of
multiple petitions is not "essential to proof of sham." 's The other
major line of cases maintains that repetitive, baseless suits must be
shown to establish an antitrust violation. These cases generally
note that the Lektro-Vend holding did not deal directly with the
single sham suit issue, and tend to look instead to the "repetitive
suits" language in California Motor Transport, which, despite
some ambiguity, was at least joined in by a majority of the Court.8
It is likely that courts will continue to differ on the single
sham suit issue. The "pattern of baseless repetitive claims" lan-
guage of California Motor Transport will be treated by some as
making multiple sham suits a prerequisite for antitrust liability.
However, the better analyses will be those which look behind this
language to the precedents relied upon in California Motor Trans-
port and which, like Justice Stevens' dissent in Lektro-Vend, view
those words as an "illustration" of an antitrust violation85 and not
79. Id. at 1096.
80. Id.
81. E.g., Colorado Petroleum Marketers Assn v. Southland Corp., 476 F. Supp. 373 (D.
Colo. 1979); Cyborg Systems, Inc. v. Management Science America, Inc., [1978] TME REG.
REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 61,927 (N.D. Ill. 1978). As the judge in Colorado Petroleum put it-
"I am not convinced that the court intended to give every dog one free bite, thus making it
an irrebuttable presumption that the. first lawsuit was not a sham regardless of overwhelm-
ing evidence indicating otherwise." 476 F. Supp. at 378.
82. Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 546 n.6 (5th Cir.
1978).
83. Id.
84. See cases cited in note 74 supra.
85. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 662 (1977)(dissenting opinion).
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a minimum standard. The single sham suit can be a very signifi-
cant restraint of trade or act in furtherance of monopolization, and
it should be prohibited by the Sherman Act. More importantly, as
discussed below, the constitutional guarantee of the right of peti-
tion which underlies Noerr-Pennington immunity protects only le-
gitimate suits and not sham litigation, whether that litigation con-
sists of one knowingly baseless complaint or many.
IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING SHAM LITIGATION
The antitrust immunity extended to good faith litigation by
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is based on the first amendment's
protection of the right of petition and the freedom of association."
Since constitutional rights supersede conflicting statutes, litigation
and other petitioning activity is immune from Sherman Act liabil-
ity wherever it is protected by the first amendment. Not all unsuc-
cessful litigation should be the basis for antitrust liability, how-
ever: only knowingly baseless suits are unprotected by the first
amendment. Furthermore, only when sham activity would be an-
ticompetitive or otherwise violate the Sherman Act can it be the
subject of an antitrust suit. An understanding of the sham excep-
tion to Noerr-Pennington thus requires analysis of the relationship
between constitutional requirements and antitrust concerns, and of
attempts to deal with sham litigation outside the antitrust context.
A. Constitutional Considerations
The rights to petition the government for redress of grievances
and to associate for that purpose are closely related to other first
amendment rights of expression. 7 Since the right to petition is
much less frequently litigated than other first amendment rights,
the case law concerning that right is not as fully developed and
does not provide the same rich background for interpreting the
right in new situations. Several important cases have been decided,
however. For example, in NAACP v. Button,88 the Supreme Court
86. See generally, Fischel, supra note 2.
87. See generally, Fischel, supra note 2, at 96-104; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw §§ 12-23, 16-11, 16-43 (1978). While the right to petition is specifically provided for in
the first amendment, the right to associate for that purpose has been implied from other
first amendment guarantees, L. TamE, § 12-23, and from the due process right of access to
the courts. Fischel, supra note 2, at 97 n.99.
88. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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held that state laws which had the effect of preventing Blacks from
bringing race discrimination suits were unconstitutionally vague
and broad. The Court said that in addition to speech, "the First
Amendment . . . protects vigorous advocacy, certainly of lawful
ends, against government intrusion.""" As conducted by the
NAACP, litigation was protected as "a form of political expres-
sion."' 0 One year after Button, the Court accorded first amend-
ment protection to a union's procedure for assisting its injured
members in obtaining counsel, despite a state court decision that
the procedure constituted the solicitation of legal business.9 1
Rights of petition and association made state interference uncon-
stitutional, even though the personal injury litigation aided by the
union procedure did not have the same political content as the
race discrimination suits at issue in Button
2
Although first amendment protection is afforded to litigation
aimed at securing constitutional rights or assisting union members
in obtaining counsel, the same protection is not necessarily availa-
ble for ordinary commercial litigation. An analysis of the founda-
tions upon which the first amendment rests is essential to a deter-
mination of the extent to which Button concepts can be applied to
commercial lawsuits.
The philosophical and political bases for the first amendment
are varied and overlapping.9 3 Free expression is seen as a means of
89. Id. at 429.
90. Id.
91. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). In this case, the union
had adopted a procedure by which injured members or their dependents would be visited by
a local union employee who would "recommend that the claim not be settled without first
seeing a lawyer, and that in the Brotherhood's judgment the best lawyer to consult was the
counsel selected by it for that area." Id. at 4. The Virginia State Bar claimed that this
procedure constituted the unlawful solicitation of legal business and the unauthorized prac-
tice of law in Virginia and obtained a state court injunction prohibiting use of the proce-
dure. The Supreme Court struck down the injunction, holding that the "First Amendments
guarantees of free speech, petition and assembly give railroad workers the right to gather
together for the lawful purposes of helping and advising one another" in asserting their legal
rights, id. at 5, and that the state injunction unconstitutionally "handicapped" the union
members' "right to petition the courts." Id. at 7. See also United Transp. Union v. State
Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Assn, 389
U.S. 217 (1967).
92. The dissenters argued that the non-political nature of the litigation distinguished
the case from Button. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. at 10 (1964).
93. For a review of the literature, see L. TRmE, supra note 87, § 12-1. See also T. EMaER-
SON, A SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-9 (1970).
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arriving at the truth through competition in the "marketplace of
ideas,"'" as leading government toward democratically approved
policies,9 5 and as fulfilling personal and group needs for self-ex-
pression."' These theories, while complementary, have different
implications as to the kind of speech they consider most worthy of
protection. For example, writers who emphasize the central impor-
tance of speech to political life would afford virtually absolute pro-
tection to political speech, but less protection to literary expres-
sion.9 7 Of course, the Supreme Court has not adopted an all-
inclusive, unified theory of the first amendment; instead, the Court
has picked its way through the cases in a manner suggesting there
are several categories of expression that will be analyzed in differ-
ent terms.9 8
If the first amendment is the basis for immunity from the an-
titrust laws, conduct challenged as anticompetitive must be evalu-
ated by first amendment criteria. Even if business disputes are not
considered "political" in the narrow sense, corporations and indi-
viduals certainly have legitimate economic and constitutional in-
terests in having their legal rights adjudicated by the courts, and
decisions involving "commercial speech" and litigation of "private"
claims have made it clear that the first amendment applies to such
expression.99 Indeed, California Motor Transport, the very case
94. The 'marketplace' analogy is from Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). Its most famous antecedent is Milton's Areopagitica
(1644), in COMPLETE POETRY AND SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN MILTON 677 (Modern Library ed.
1950). See also J.S. MILL, ON LimERTY (1859); ("Of the Liberty of Thought and Discus-
sion,") in UTILITARINIsM, ON LmrSRTY, ESSAY ON BENTHAM 141 (M. Warnock, ed. 1962).
95. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
J.S. Mill, supra note 94. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
96. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring); T.
EMERSON, supra note 93, at 6.
97. See L. TRIME, supra note 87, at § 12-1. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957), the Court upheld an obscenity statute saying, "[T]he protection given speech and
press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of polit-
ical and social changes desired by the people." Id. at 484. The Court has since moved away
from this primarily instrumental view of freedom of expression. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-85
(1978)(dissenting opinion).
98. T. EMERSON, supra note 93, at 15-16.
99. For the "private" claim cases, see note 91 supra. Commercial speech cases have
protected advertising, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), and political
campaigning on referendum issues, First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
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that first put the right of access to the courts on a firm footing as
one aspect of the right of petition, involved corporations engaged
in business-related litigation. It is also apparent, however, that cur-
rent case law does not give commercial speech the same high de-
gree of protection enjoyed by political speech. Commercial speech
has been viewed by the Court as less intrinsic to the democratic
process than political speech and therefore less deserving of pro-
tection.100 It has also been described as "hardier" and more readily
and objectively verified than political speech and therefore less
needful of protection.10 1 Despite these differences (and the greater
scope of regulation that will be allowed in the commercial area),
the existence of some first amendment protection is clear. Recent
commercial speech cases have dealt with advertising and free ex-
pression issues rather than the right to litigate,102 but to the extent
these cases rest on the applicability of first amendment fundamen-
tals to business matters, they are directly relevant. Moreover, since
the first amendment guarantees individuals the right to associate
for purposes of private litigation, serious equal protection issues
would be raised if business entities were not accorded a similar
right.103 Therefore, litigation, like speech, should be privileged
(1978). See generally L. TRmz, supra note 87, at § 12-15.
100. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)(state could prohibit practice of optometry
under trade name); Nat'l Soc'y of Prof. Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978)(court
could enjoin association from adopting official policy statement implying that competitive
bidding was unethical). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Jackson & Jeffries,
Commercial Speech, Economic Due Process, and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1
(1979); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L. J. 1001 (1976).
In Friedman, for example, the court distinguished First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978), noting that the statute at issue in Bellotti:
[P]rohibited the bank from publicizing its views on the merits of a proposed
state constitutional amendment that was to be submitted to a referendum. In
holding that the statute was unconstitutional, the Court stated that free discus-
sion of governmental affairs 'is at the heart of the First Amendment's protection'
... Such speech is categorically different from the mere solicitation of pa-
tronage implicit in a trade name.
400 U.S. 1, at 11 n.10.
101. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976).
102. E.g., Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)(advertising); First Nat'l Bank v. Bel-
lotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)(political expression). Of course, California Motor Transp. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 578 (1972), which put the Noerr-Pennington doctrine on a
clear first amendment basis, involved the right of corporations to litigate in a commercial
setting.
103. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786-92 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 11 (1976).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
under the antitrust laws, and the party claiming that Noerr-Pen-
nington immunity does not apply should have the burden of prov-
ing that the litigation was brought in bad faith.104
Building on the analogy to the first amendment cases, it is
clear that the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington immunity can
be equated with speech that is not protected by the first amend-
ment. Sham litigation, like intentional falsehoods, serves no first
amendment interest that would require constitutional protec-
tion.10 5 The first amendment interests involved in private litiga-
tion-compensation for violated rights and interests, the psycho-
logical benefits of vindication, public airing of disputed facts-are
not advanced when the litigation is based on intentional falsehoods
or on knowingly frivolous claims. 0 6 Furthermore, since sham litiga-
tion by definition does not involve a bona fide grievance, it does
not come within the first amendment right to petition.1 0 7 There-
fore, just as intentional falsehoods may be the basis for libel ac-
tions, sham litigation may constitute the conduct element in an an-
titrust suit.
Yet it is difficult to determine the approach that should be
taken toward falsity in the free speech context and sham litigation
in the antitrust field. As Fischel has pointed out, "[it] is necessary
... to protect some false statements and baseless claims in order
to avoid inhibiting valuable petitioning,"108 and the free speech
cases clearly recognize this by requiring evidence that the speaker
knew he was lying or recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of
his statement. 09 The constitutional analysis above suggests that
104. Indeed, this will be the normal procedural posture, with the plaintiff required to
prove the elements of an antitrust violation, including the fact that the litigation brought by
the defendant was a sham. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 996 (9th Cir.
1979). If the sham litigation issue is raised by a defendant as an affirmative defense or
counterclaim, he will have the burden of proving that the suit filed against him is a sham.
105. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974)("[T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact."); California
Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515 (1972).
106. See note 105 supra.
107. Fischel, supra note 2, at 101.
108. Id. See Mid-Texas Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372
(5th Cir. 1980).
109. This, of course, is the standard for libel actions by "public figures." See New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). When public figures are not involved, states may
define the appropriate standard, "so long as they do not impose liability without fault."
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974). In the commercial litigation context
under discussion here, the privacy and personal reputation interests paramount in private
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the first amendment protects litigation from antitrust liability to
the same extent that speech is protected from government restric-
tion. Therefore, litigation that a plaintiff knows to be without le-
gitimate foundation, like known falsehoods in the free speech area,
is unprotected, but in order to err on the side of protecting first
amendment values, the standard for challenging sham suits as an-
titrust violations should be relatively high.
Finally, while the "pattern of baseless repetitive claims" lan-
guage was first used to identify activity that did not constitute a
genuine attempt to influence government action, more recent cases
have used the phrase in a different way.11 0 Since the first amend-
ment is now seen as the basis for the Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine,""" the "repetitive claims" requirement can be viewed as a
standard designed to protect the first amendment right to conduct
legitimate litigation. Because such litigation has first amendment
value, this high standard is imposed even though it may have the
unintended effect of protecting some litigation that is not legiti-
mate and does not deserve protection. While some courts that re-
quire multiple baseless suits have not articulated this first amend-
ment rationale as the basis for their use of the "repetitive claims"
language, others have, and it clearly is the present-day rationale
for the multiple suit requirement.11 2 Similarly, the "access-bar-
libel actions are less important. Therefore, adherence to the higher New York Times stan-
dard of malice seems appropriate. The choice of that standard is buttressed by the fact that
baseless suits in the antitrust context may lead to treble damages, and, like punitive dam-
ages in a non-public person libel suit, should be dependent upon a showing of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. See 418 U.S. at 348-50.
110. E.g., Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163, 167 (E.D. Mo.
1976), aff'd, 553 F.2d 102 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910; Miracle Mile Assoc. v.
City of Rochester, [1979] TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 62,735, at 78,151 (W.D.N.Y.
1979).
111. E.g., In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, 474 F. Supp. 1072 (N.D. Cal.
1979).
112. In California Motor Transp., the Court used the "pattern of baseless, repetitive
claims" language to illustrate h situation in which a court has already seen a party bring one
possibly baseless claim, and concludes after seeing additional baseless claims brought by the
same party, that the litigant is abusifig the judicial process. 404 U.S. 508, 513. The multiple
suit requirement was not made a constitutional requirement in California Motor Transp. or
subsequent cases, and Justice Stevens' dissent in Lektro-Vend effectively undermined its
purported basis. See Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 660-62 (1977). Many
sham litigation cases imposing the repetitive claims requirement have simply cited the Cali-
fornia Motor Transp. language. See, e.g., Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F.
Supp. 1301, 1314 (E.D. Mich. 1979); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 462 F. Supp. 1072, 1103 (N.D. Ill. 1978). However, others have cited that language and
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ring" test used by some lower courts to identify unprotected litiga-
tion imposes a relatively high standard for proving an antitrust vi-
olation. This standard also protects some undeserving litigation,
but, unlike the "repetitive suit" standard, it does not provide a
bright-line test for distinguishing protected suits from unprotected
ones.113 The question that arises, of course, is whether these stan-
dards are so protective of litigation that they undermine the poli-
cies of the antitrust laws and ignore alternatives that would pro-
tect legitimate suits, but would not provide immunity to
undeserving litigation. Resolution of this issue requires an analysis
of the policies embodied in the antitrust laws and the ways in
which courts have dealt with baseless litigation outside the anti-
trust field.
B. The Policies of the Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws are intended "to establish a regime of com-
petition as the fundamental principle governing commerce in this
country.11 4 Like other such generalizations, however, this observa-
tion does little to advance antitrust analysis. More difficult
problems arise when "competition" conflicts with other economic
goals such as efficiency and maximization of general welfare, or
with non-economic goals such as "fairness" or dispersion of
power. 1 5 Whatever the mix of different purposes underlying the
antitrust laws, economic objectives are generally considered to be
paramount and, of those, competition is deemed the most impor-
tant.1 e6 However, recognition of the preeminence of economic
objectives should not preclude continued concern with
noneconomic ends. As the Supreme Court has stated, "we cannot
have viewed it as a means of protecting first amendment interests. See, e.g., Mountain
Grove Cemetery Assn v. Norwalk Vault Co., [1977] TRA4n REG. REP.(CCH) Trade Cas. 1
61,709, at 72,891 (D. Conn. 1977).
113. Unlike the "access-barring" standard, which does not provide a clear means of
distinguishing sham litigation that literally bars access to the courts from other sham litiga-
tion, the "repetitive suit" standard Tequires only that a court determine whether a party
brought more than one frivolous suit. While not a simple test, it can be used more easily and
with greater certainty than the "access-barring" standard.
114. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978).
115. See the different approaches suggested in Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. Rsv. 925 (1979); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, id. at
1051; and Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, id. at 1076. See
generally 1 P. AnREDA & D. TURNER, supra note 69 at 103-113.
116. 1 P. AREE^A & D. TURNER, supra note 69, at 1 104.
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fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through
the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. 1117 This
concern with protecting small businesses, from predators in the
marketplace has been a persistent if controversial aspect of anti-
trust.118 Also surfacing at times is a concern for fairness-the idea
that antitrust laws are intended to set equitable rules for the com-
petitive game, as well as to promote the game itself.119 The con-
tours of the sham exception to Noerr-Pennington should depend
in large part on the ways iia which liability for sham suits will fur-
ther these antitrust goals.
Sham litigation intended to eliminate or harass a competitor
can have an immediate and severe impact on competition. 2 0 In-
deed, by striking directly at a competitor through the judicial pro-
cess, it is likely that one firm can cause more harm to another than
it could through predatory pricing; exclusive-dealing, or other fre-
quently discussed anticompetitive activities. This is particularly
true when lawsuits are brought against small companies. While the
additional costs of doing business imposed on a smaller firm by a
dominant firm's predatory pricing or territorial allocation policy
may reduce profits and eventually squeeze the small firm out of
the market, the added costs bear at least some relation to the
firm's sales or share of the market. For example, a small maker of
lumber products may be prevented from expanding beyond a local
market by a monopolist's predatory pricing. Because of lower
transportation costs or hometown loyalty, however, it may at least
be able to maintain its small share of the market. Predatory litiga-
tion, on the other hand, imposes high fixed costs which are inde-
pendent of a firm's market position. Well-timed litigation can com-
pletely block the financing or administrative approval needed to
enter the market,"2 ' and even the more common sham suits such as
117. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
118. Some commentators assert that one important goal of the antitrust law is to pre-
serve and strengthen small business. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 115, at 1077. Others
claim that the antitrust law is intended to limit the concentration of economic power, but
not to provide special protections for small business. Pitofsky, stpra note 115, at 1053-55,
1058-59. Still others take the position that the antitrust laws should focus only on actions
which impare allocative efficiency, such as cartels and horizontal mergers to monopolies. See
generally Posner, supra note 115; cf. Sullivan, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. RaV. 1214 (1974).
119. E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949)(Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
120. E.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
121. Id. See also California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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theft of trade secrets or breach of non-competition agreements re-
sult in high legal bills and lost employee time. More important in
terms of the antitrust laws, however, is that by preventing or de-
laying the entry of new firms into the market, a group of corpora-
tions or a monopolist can inhibit competition, reap monopoly prof-
its, and retard innovation.
As noted at the outset, frivolous litigation weighs particularly
heavily on small businesses. In one recent case a new entrant in a
sophisticated branch of electronics production was sued by the
dominant firm in the market for alleged theft 6f trade secrets. Al-
though only three months elapsed between the filing of the com-
plaint and a settlement favorable to the fledgling corporation, the
new company ran up $50,000 in legal bills.1 2 More important in a
rapidly changing technical area, the firm's scheduled entry into the
market was delayed for several months while its key employees at-
tended depositions and participated in the litigation. Frequently,
of course, a favorable settlement is not possible and the new com-
petitor either changes its business plans or goes bankrupt.
The policies behind the antitrust laws support a vigorous at-
tack on such baseless litigation. Some writers assert that more pre-
dation is accomplished through litigation than through below-cost
pricing,12 3 and the above example of the costs imposed by litigation
supports this theory. Antitrust liability for sham litigation thus
helps preserve competition and a rough kind of "fairness" in the
marketplace. In addition, imposing liability for such litigation is
particularly important to small firms and to new entrants in a mar-
ket. The cost of defending a baseless lawsuit is relatively indepen-
dent of the size and financial strength of the defendant. For a
smaller firm, the high cost of litigation will be larger compared to
financial reserves than for a major company, and the smaller firm
will be more likely to be driven out of the market. Thus, another
frequently voiced goal of the antitrust laws-the preservation of
viable small businesses-is furthered by imposing liability for
sham litigation. 2
122. This information was obtained in confidence from an officer of the company
involved.
123. R. BORK, supra note 2, at 357.
124. Sham litigation is relatively more burdensome for small businesses than for larger
ones and thus the imposition of antitrust liability for such actions tends to be relatively
more important to the smaller competitor. This is a consequence of the economics of litiga.
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C. Frivolous Litigation in Other Contexts
If the only effective means of protecting the first amendment
right to petition was the "repetitive suit" or the "access-barring"
standard, one of these rules would have to be adopted, despite the
damage that might result to the vigorous enforcement of the anti-
trust laws. However, courts have been successful in discouraging
frivolous litigation in other contexts without serious intrusion upon
first amendment rights. Antitrust analysis can benefit from an ex-
amination of these other means of dealing with sham litigation.
Common law courts have sought to protect their own integrity
and the rights of individuals and corporations through the imposi-
tion of liability for malicious prosecution and abuse of process.125
The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are (1) the ab-
sence of probable cause for initiating the proceeding, (2) a primary
motivation other than seeking legal redress, and (3) termination of
the proceeding in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff.1 26
These requirements mesh well with the constitutional and anti-
trust policies described above. Furthermore, the requirement that
the allegedly malicious proceedings be terminated in favor of the
plaintiff protects legitimate litigation without imposing the exces-
sively high "repetitive suit" standard. Moreover, courts have gen-
erally used an objective standard in determining whether or not
there is probable cause to bring the allegedly baseless suit, and
have required malicious prosecution plaintiffs to demonstrate that
the defendant's decision to litigate was "clearly" unreasonable.127
While the malicious prosecution analogy is helpful, the "favorable
termination" requirement places an often severe burden on the
malicious prosecution plaintiff by preventing him from bringing
tion, not the result of some special policy of protecting small business. Unlike certain other
antitrust doctrines which some writers claim protect small or uncompetitive businesses at
the expense of economic efficiency-for example, the prohibition of resale price mainte-
nance, tie-ins, and vertical restrictions-liability for sham litigation does not reduce effi-
ciency or protect uncompetitive firnis. This means of protecting small businesses should
therefore be immune from the attacks of those who generally think the antitrust laws should
not be used to protect "the aesthetic delights of smallness and the yearning to resurrect a
nation of sturdy Jeffersonian yeomen." Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Ap-
proach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 13 (1977); cf. L. SULLI-
vAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 377-471 (1977).
125. See Note, supra note 69.
126. Id. at 728. See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs 835 (4th ed. 1971).
127. W. PROSSER, supra note 126, at 841-47.
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suit as long as the allegedly baseless litigation is pending. The real
burden on the defendant in the baseless suit may be the cost of
litigation, and the right to sue after going bankrupt defending a
baseless suit is of little value. At the same time, allowing the defen-
dant in the baseless proceeding to have the merits of the complaint
tested, often in another court, while the first suit is pending, raises
thorny jurisdictional questions.128 Furthermore, if the sham suit is
not only frivolous, but also is based on intentional falsehoods, its
successful prosecution does'not mean that the complaint was meri-
torious in the first place.'29 For these reasons, the malicious prose-
cution analogy is not particularly useful.
A more useful analogy to sham litigation in the antitrust con-
text may be drawn from the tort of abuse of process. A successful
cause of action for abuse of process requires a showing "that the
defendant instituted the litigation with the purpose of achieving a
'collateral' objective, and that he committed a specific act-other
than those acts incidental to the normal use of the court or
agency-directed at attaining that objective."130 Unlike malicious
prosecution, abuse of process does not depend on the absence of
probable cause or termination in favor of the plaintiff. Some writ-
ers applying the abuse of process analogy in the antitrust context
indicate that even a legitimate suit can be the basis for an anti-
trust violation, if the suit is brought primarily for an anticompeti-
tive purpose, such as driving the other party out of business. 31
However, the mere prosecution of a legitimate suit, even with such
an anticompetitive intent, is not an abuse of process and should
not be the basis for an antitrust claim. Abuse of process requires
specific acts, other than those incidental to legitimate use of the
courts, which are directed toward the attainment of the collateral
objective. 3 2 For example, suppose a corporation brought a merito-
128. See Note, 1977 Wxs. L. REv. 1208, 1220-24.
129. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 474 F. Supp. 168, 179 (D. Del. 1979).
130. See Note, supra note 69, at.732. See also Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Air-
ways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
131. See Note, supra note 69, at 732-35. On the relationship between intent and tort
generally, see Ames, How Far An Act May Be A Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of
the Actor, 18 HRv. L. Rnv. 411 (1905).
132. W. PRossER, supra note 126, at 856-88. See also Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d
1213, 1217 (3d Cir. 1977)("If a prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is used for
a purpose other than that intended by the law, malicious abuse of process lies."): Voytko v.
Ramada Inn of Atlantic City, 445 F. Supp. 315, 325 (D.N.J. 1978)("The elements of mali-
cious abuse of process are just two: (1) the defendant has set legal process in motion for an
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rious breach of contract suit against a competitor, with the intent
both to win the suit on the merits and to prevent the competitor
from expanding into a geographic market dominated by the plain-
tiff corporation. As long as the plaintiff pursues the contract suit in
a normal manner, it is protected, despite plaintiff's desire to
achieve an anticompetitive effect collateral to the relief sought in
the proceeding. If, however, the parties engage in settlement nego-
tiations and the plaintiff offers to drop the suit in exchange for the
defendant's agreement not to expand, there has been an abuse of
process. The tort consists of using a legitimate suit as a "threat or
a club" to obtain an end not sought directly in the proceedings. 133
As Prosser writes, it is "a form of extortion, and it is what is done
in the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance or any formal
use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort.' 134 Also, the
requirement that the defendant commit an additional specific act
before liability for abuse of process can result is crucial to the pro-
tection of the general first amendment right to bring legitimate
suits and to the preservation of the Noerr-Pennington defense to
antitrust claims. Prosecution of a legitimate suit is still protected
by the first amendment. Only when that suit is accompanied by an
anticompetitive intent and by other acts directed towards an an-
ticompetitive result can an antitrust violation be established,'3 " for
it is only in such a situation that the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess is impaired by its use as an instrumentality to achieve a collat-
eral objective. The antitrust violation arises, then, not from the
prosecution of the lawsuit itself, but from the other acts taken to
achieve an anticompetitive end. The first amendment offers little
protection to the person who abuses the judicial process by bring-
ing a suit intended to achieve an illegal collateral objective and
who takes other steps toward that end.
While some antitrust decisions have made use of the abuse of
improper ulterior purpose, and (2) the defendant has committed- a willful act in the use of
process which perverts the regular conduct of the proceeding to accomplish the improper
purpose.").
133. W. PROSSER, supra note 126, at 857.
134. Id.
135. Since the suit which is later claimed to be part of an abuse of process may not
actually be baseless or frivolous itself, it is not precisely accurate to call it a "sham" suit.
However, the suit is a sham in the sense that it is a ruse or cover for pursuing some end
other than that ostensibly sought in the proceeding itself.
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process analogy,' s6 courts should be cautious about its wholesale
adoption. The possibility of incurring treble damages for bringing
a legitimate suit "primarily" for a collateral, anticompetitive pur-
pose may discourage protected litigation and involve courts in con-
fusing questions of a plaintiff's motive for bringing a particular
suit. However, this danger can be minimized by close attention to
the additional requirement of other specific acts directed towards
the collateral objective. As an added safeguard for first amendment
interests, and to comport with existing sham exception cases,3 7
courts could require the antitrust plaintiff to show that the suit
against it was brought without probable cause. The combination of
the "absence of probable cause" element of malicious prosecution
and the "additional specific acts" element of abuse of process
might be better suited to the antitrust context than either of the
two common law torts standing alone. Also, there may still be cases
in which antitrust liability should be based on the filing of a single
sham suit and no other specific acts, and such findings should not
be prohibited by slavish adherence to common law tort principles.
However, the standards discussed above should prove useful in an-
alyzing the great majority of sham suit cases.
Another fruitful source of assistance in determining what is a
sham suit is the rapidly developing law dealing with situations in
which attorneys' fees and costs can be awarded against a party who
brings a frivolous suit or appeal.23 8 In deciding whether a suit is
136. See, e.g., Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Executive
Bd., 542 F.2d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 940 (1977); Associated
Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc. 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
137. While sham litigation can be based on abuse of the judicial process by means other
than the filing of baseless suits, see Fischel, supra note 2, at 107-08, there is strong dicta in
the Supreme Court opinions that baseless litigation must be shown. See Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 380 (1973); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972). Showing that the litigation was baseless is not constitu-
tionally required; harassing litigation which abuses the judicial process is unprotected by the
first amendment even if the initial complaint was based on probable cause. The suggestion
here is that courts may be uncertain about when abuse of process has occurred and the
additional requirement that the sham suit be baseless may make the determination of anti-
trust liability more certain.
138. Statutes have long allowed courts to award costs or to take other action to discour-
age frivolous appeals. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1976) (federal court may dismiss in
forma pauperis proceeding if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious); MASs.
GEs. LAws ANN. ch. 211, § 10 (West)(single or double costs may be assessed for frivolous
appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court). Procedural rules also allow the awarding of costs
for such appeals. See, e.g., MAss. R. App. P. 25 (Just damages and single or double costs may
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frivolous or whether it was brought in bad faith, courts are making
rules that will be useful in identifying sham litigation in the anti-
trust context. The attorneys' fees cases confront the same issues of
bad faith and baseless litigation as do the antitrust cases, and
there too, courts have sought ways to deter and punish frivolous
litigation while protecting the right to bring legitimate suits even
when success is not assured. In Nemeroff v. Abelson,13 9 the court
took the unusual step of. assessing defendant's attorneys' fees
against both the plaintiff in the frivolous suit'and the plaintiff's
attorneys. The court used the malicious prosecution analogy in de-
ciding whether the suit was brought in bad faith, and thus had to
consider the requirement that the questioned lawsuit had been ter-
minated in favor of the malicious prosecution plaintiff. After not-
ing that "termination" did not necessarily require a final judgment
or other decision on the merits, the court determined that the stip-
ulation dismissing the complaint, with prejudice, while reserving
defendant's rights to seek attorneys' fees and costs, fulfilled the
requirement.140 Clearly, analyses such as that used in Nemeroff can
be extremely helpful in the antitrust context.
This short review of means used by the courts to protect the
integrity of the judicial process and to discourage frivolous litiga-
be assessed for frivolous appeals.) In addition, both statutes and procedural rules provide
for sanctions against attorneys and litigants who abuse the judicial process by filing baseless
claims. For example, FaD. R. Civ. P. 11 requires that an attorney signing a pleading must
believe that there is good ground to support it. A pleading "signed with intent to defeat the
purpose of this rule" may be stricken as "sham and false," and a willful violation may sub-
ject the attorney to "appropriate disciplinary action." Id. In addition, § 9(e) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976), provides that in suits involving securi-
ties manipulation, "[tihe court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the
payment of costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys'
fees, against either party litigant." Id. The growing case law dealing with the definition of
"sham" or "frivolous" suits in these statutes and rules may be of use in the antitrust
context.
139. 469 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-7366 (2d Cir. May 25,
1979); see Note, Nemeroff v. Abelson, Bad Faith and Award of Attorneys' Fees, 128 U. PA.
L. Rav. 468 (1979).
140. 469 F. Supp. at 641-42. In another recent case, Browning Debenture Holders'
Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit reviewed the award
of attorneys' fees in a securities fraud case. The court reversed a district court finding that
the action had been brought in bad faith. The court of appeals found, however, that one
party had acted in bad faith in taking certain procedural steps, including "the appeal of
mooted issues, the delay for discovery never undertaken. . . the motion to add parties on
the basis of a misleading page of a letter taken out of context," and remanded for a determi-
nation of attorneys' fees related to that bad faith conduct. Id. at 1088.
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tion discloses the variety of judicial tools and possible analogies
available. In light of these potential resources, there is no need for
courts to adhere to the "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims"
standard or the "access-barring" requirement in distinguishing
sham suits from legitimate ones. A single baseless suit as one of a
series of anticompetitive acts-or, in the rare case, a single baseless
suit standing along-should be sufficient to state a cause of action
under the antitrust laws.1
CONCLUSION
The judicial process should not be available to business enti-
ties that bring baseless suits for the purpose of harassing or elimi-
nating competitors. While "predation through governmental
processes1 42 is an established basis for antitrust liability, the stan-
dards that differentiate such violations from acts entitled to No-
err-Pennington immunity require further refinement.
As a first step, the sham exception should be clarified to indi-
cate that antitrust liability is based on abuse of the judicial process
by the filing of baseless suits with the intent to impair competition
or the use of legitimate suits to attain collateral anticompetitive
ends, rather than on conduct which bars a competitor from use of
judicial or administrative processes. While Otter Tail Power
should have laid to rest any contention that baseless litigation
must rise to the level of "access-barring" to constitute an antitrust
violation, later cases suggest that a more definite statement from
the Supreme Court is required to end remaining uncertainty.
Second, the "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" language,
which originated as one possible means of showing intent to elimi-
nate a competitor and which has become a prerequisite for anti-
trust liability in some courts, should be repudiated. As this article
has shown, first amendment considerations require a clear showing
that the antitrust defendant knew that his prior suit was frivolous
and without probable cause, that it was brought with reckless dis-
regard of the presence or absence of probable cause, or that it was
an abuse of the judicial process. However, the first amendment
does not require the excessively high repetitive suit standard, and
141. However, while courts should attempt to prevent baseless litigation that reduces
competition, they must also be aware of the possibility of baseless antitrust complaints.
142. R. BoRK, supra note 2, at 347.
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courts should instead draw on the analogies of abuse of process,
malicious prosecution, and other means that have been developed
to discourage frivolous litigation. Particularly in the antitrust con-
text, where the cost of baseless litigation can effectively prevent
new competitors from entering the market, courts should not be
overly solicitous of the interests of corporations that commence
frivolous commercial litigation.
Finally, the more general concern that emerges from this arti-
cle is the need for courts to be sensitive to the costs that may be
unfairly imposed upon businesses when frivolous proceedings are
instituted by their competitors. In a litigious society, it may be dif-
ficult to separate legitimate suits from illegitimate ones, and even
more difficult to set standards that protect litigants from good
faith mistakes without inhibiting valid lawsuits. But when the pri-
mary goals of the antitrust laws can be undercut so directly and
destructively through the ostensibly neutral instrumentality of the
courts, an attempt to confront the problem must be made. Courts
must attempt to reconcile first amendment interests with the pol-
icy of free and fair competition that is embodied in the antitrust
laws. In this way, a modest contribution can be made to the pre-
vention of anticompetitive activity and to the preservation of the
integrity of the judicial process.
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